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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STA.TE OF UTAH

!

STATE OF UTAH, by and through '.
its Road Commission,
Plaintiff-Respondent,,
vs.

I

Case No.
10832

EYA WHITE and NOEL "\VHITE, )
her husband ' Defendants-Appe
.
zlants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Condemnation proceeding by plaintiff in the District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, to
condemn 17. 70 acres of defendants' land and improvements situated in Summit County, said condemned
lands to be used by plaintiff for the purpose of constructing a portion of Interstate Highway 1-80. The
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appellants appeal from the denial of a motion for additur ,or, in the alternative, a new trial, by the Third
Judicial District Court, Summit County, Utah.

DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
Trial of this case was had before a jury in the
District Court of Salt Lake County, by order of the
court, before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, Judge, on
the 28th day of November, 1966, concluding on November 29, 1966.
An amended judgment on the verdict was duly
entered January 27, 1967, awarding these defendants
the sum of $56,000 for value of land taken by plaintiff,
$29,000 for the value of improvements taken by plaintiff, no severance damage to the remaining property
by reason of the taking, for a total award of $85,000.
Added to that amount was the sum of $4,626.50 as
stipulated value for trade fixtures, for a total award of
$89,626.50. Defendants filed a motion for additur, or,
in the alternative, a new trial which, after hearing, was
denied by the Honorable A. H. Ellett, whereupon appellants prosecuted this appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits the order of the Third Judicial Court denying appellants' motion for additur, or,
in the alternative, a new trial, be affirmed.
2

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Respondent agrees fundamentally with the statement of facts as contained in appellants' brief, however, respondent submits that the entry of respondent
onto appellants' property and the partial removal and
destruction of certain improvements located thereon
was pursuant to the intended purpose for which the
premises were sought by the respondent, and was necessary and proper as part of the highway construction
project (R-8, -9, -10).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR ADDITUR, OR,
FOR NEW TRIAL, SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT
ERROR IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO
YIE'V THE PREMISES.
Utah R. Civ. P. 47 (j) states:
When in the opinion of the court is is proper
for the jury to have a view of the property which
is the subject of litigation, ... it may order them
to be conducted in a body under the charge of an
officer to the place, which shall be shown to them
by some person appointed by the court for that
purpose . . .
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The matter of allowing the jury to view the premises is purely one of trial court discretion. Such discretion has vested in the trial courts even under the
common law, and the rule is applicable in eminent domain cases. See 53 Am. Jur., Trial § 441, 5 Nichols on
Eminent Domain,§ 18.3 (3d ed. 1962); Johr, Eminent
Domain, 371 (1953); Stat. 4 Anne, Ch. 16, § 8.
The permitting of a view by the jury of property
involved in litigation is a matter so largely in the discretion of the trial court that its decision will not be
disputed except for palpable abuse. Balle v. Smith, 81
Utah 179, 17 P.2d 224 ( 1932).
In many cases the courts have upheld the action
of the trial court in allowing the jury to view the premises in question notwithstanding changed conditions
of the property since the date of taking by the condemning authority.
The fact that the condition of a part of the land
taken has been materially changed after possession by
the government did not show the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing the jury to view the premises
after the conclusion of the examination of witnesses
at trial where there was conflicting testimony as to
the quality of land and other features affecting its value.
Forbes v. United States, 268 Fed. 273 (5th Cir. 1920).
Even where substantial changes have occurred in the
land and improvements, the view by the jury of the
subject property has been held not to constitute error
or an abuse of discretion of the trial court. See United
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States v. 2.4 Acres of Land, 138 F.2d 295 (7th Cir.
1943); South Park Cornrs. v. Livingston, 334 Ill. 368,
176 N.E. 546 (1931), Annot. 77 A.L.R.2d 458, 571
(1961).
At the conclusion of the testimony and evidence,
and prior to the jury being charged by the court and
summation and argument of counsel, the trial court
expressed its opinion that the jury should view the
property, and made the following statement to the jury:
... I want these gentlemen to see that place,
so they will know better how to weigh the testimony of the witnesses that have testified here.
'Vhat you see won't constitute you an expert
so you could go ahead and throw out this testimony, but it will help you in weighing the testimony of the witnesses . . . . (TR-185, 186}.
Prior to that time evidence and testimony had been
presented to the jury concerning the condition of the
property, and the type and condition of the improvements located thereon. Introduced in evidence were
maps showing the configuration of appellants' property, its contour and location with respect to adjoining
properties, existing highways, and the proposed highway construction (Ex. P-1, P-2}. In addition, photographs of improvements had been introduced by appellants showing the condition of such improvements as
of the date of taking by respondent, November 22,
1965 (Ex. D-3, -4, -5, -6, -7, -8, -9, -10).
~ppellants had introduced extensive testimony

describing the property and its condition and use as
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of November 22, 1965. The entire testimony of appellant Noel White was concerned with a description of
the property, its uses, history, and condition (TR25-49). Appellants' appraiser, Mr. Kiepe, described
the condition of the land and improvements ( Tr-70,
Tr-75) as did another appraiser of appellants', Mr.
Baum. (TR-116-119, TR-120, TR-131-133).
The jury was well advised the condition of the
premises was not the same at the time of trial as it was
at the time of taking, November 22, 1965. Counsel for
appellants stated in the presence of the jury:
The remnants of the old demolished building
and motel that the State has torn down is located
at the westerly edge. ( TR-186)

* * *

This old building has been moved. The motel
has been demolished, but the shell is there. (TR186)
Discussion between the court and counsel in the
presence of the jury produced the following:
THE COURT: I believe someone said that
the pictures show the situation, and I believe
you gentlemen can agree that the inside knotty
pine has been removed.
MR. WALL: This is true.
MR. WEGGELAND: Yes, and some of the
trade fixtures have been removed also, Your
Honor. These items of personal property are
not an issue here.
THE COURT: That's right.
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:MR. YVEGGELAND: The exterior of the
structures are in approximately the same condition except they have been boarded up in a
couple of instances.
lVIR. 'VALL: The one building has been totally demolished and moved away.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. WALL: The improvements, as far as I
am concerned, there would be nothing gained
by looking at them.
THE COURT: Well, it may be that they
ought to take a look. There is a dispute in the
amount of land that could be adapted to commercial purposes.

* * *

MR. 'VALL: I wish we could have the State
restore the improvements to the condition they
were in in November 22 to give the jury a true
impression, your Honor. The land doesn't change
like the improvements
THE COURT: The jurors will understand
that the property has been-on the inside has
been changed and altered, so it would be of no
help to be studying the inside of it. The outside
may be looked at, and particularly the amount
of land, the amount that might be used for commercial purposes, the amount that might be
used for residential purposes, and the amount
that might be used for grazing I suppose could
be of help if the jurors were to see it. That will
give us a little less rush time to get our instructions, and so I think probably I would let the
sheriff carry out his responsibilities. We made
arrangements for him to have cars at nine o'clock
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in the morning, so if you gentlemen would come
here, we would have sheriff to come up and
make the arrangements with him to take you up.
(TR-202-204)
Following the view of the premises by the jury,
they were instructed that the ten-unit motel, together
with laundry facilities, had been totally taken by the
plaintiff, and that the jury was instructed to consider
said motel complex to be a total taking by the State
of Utah and award to the defendant landowners such
damages as the jury determined applicable thereto in
accordance with the remainder of the other instructions.
(Inst. 19, R90)
The jury was properly instructed with respect to
the purpose for viewing the premises and to the weight
they should give to the knowledge gained thereby. The
jury was instructed:

* * •

You are to consider the testimony of all witnesses, but if after viewing the premises and
after a consideration of all the evidence in this
case you believ that any witness who has testified to the value of the land and the damage by
reason of severance thereto gave testimony which
is not the reasonable value thereof, you may disregard that testimony even though it comes from
an expert. (Inst. 21, R92)

* * *

You are instructed that any information or
knowledge obtained by you while viewing the
property involved in this case can be used by you
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only for the purpose of determining the weight
and applicability of the testimony and evidence
introduced at the trial of this case.
In other words, your view of the property involved in this case is not evidence, in and of
itself, upon which a verdict may be based, but
it may be used only to aid you in better understanding and weighing the testimony brought
forth by the witnesses who have appeared. (Inst.
23, R94)
In affirming the denial of a motion for new trial,
this court stated in the case of P. A. Sorenson Co. v.
Denver R. G. R. Co., 49 Utah 548, 164 Pac. 1020, 1021
(1917), with respect to the jury's view of property
which is the subject of litigation:
At the trial, on the conclusion of the testimony, the jury, after being admonished by the
trial judge as to the purposes, were permitted
to view the premises. Plaintiff contends that the
trial judge failed to properly and sufficiently
admonish the jury as to the purposes of the
view, and thereafter failed to charge the jury
as to what weight they should give to the knowledge thereby. The record discloses that counsel
for plaintiff was present in court. He made no
objection whatever as to the jury not being
properly admonished, nor did counsel request
that more implicit instructions be then given.
It will be seen therefore, assuming that there
would be some merit to the contentions of counsel, that it was due the trial court that they
presented at a time when they could have been
considered and acted upon before the conclusion
of the trial, not on motion for a new trial, nor
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on appeal to this court. However, the trial court
did admonish the jury as to the purpose before
the view, and, as we think, quite properly, by
telling them-'N ot to talk about the case at all·
to look is all you are to do. Not to take accounts'.
measurements, or go out to act as detectives.
Not to be searchers for anything that hasn't
been brought before you or suggested to you.
Just view the premises.'
Contrary to the allegations of appellants herein,
the record discloses they made no objection to the view
of the property by the jury, nor did they object as to the
jury not being properly admonished, nor did they
request that more implicit instructions be then given.
Respondent submits that the trial court in no way
abused its discretion in allowing the jury to view the
property involved in this action. Respondent further
submits the appellants have failed to show such palpable
abuse as would require this court to disturb the decision of the trial court to allow such view.
B. THE JURY WAS NOT GUILTY OF l\IISCONDUCT NOR DID IT ACT IMPROPERLY OR CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS.
As a general proposition, it can be said that every
suitor is entitled to have his case tried before a qualified and impartial jury. Accordingly, misconduct of
the jury, when of a prejudicial character or such as
to wararnt the belief that the fairness and propriety
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of the trial has been impaired, or that injury has resulted therefrom, is recognized in all jurisdictions as
proper cause for a new trial. However, it is well
established that not every instance of misconduct by
a juror will require a new trial. The general principle
underlying the case is that the misconduct must be
such as to affect the impartiality of the jury or disqualify them from exercising the powers of reason and
judgment. A new trial will not be granted for misconduct of the jury if no substantial harm was done
thereby to the party seeking the new trial if there is
nothing to indicate any improper bias upon the juror's
mind, or if the court cannot see that the alleged misconduct either had, or might have had, an effect unfavorable to the moving party. See 39 Am. J ur., New
Trial,§ 70 (1942).
Furthermore, the traditional rule that a new trial
will not be ordered where it is apparent that the result
of another trial would be the same as that of the trial
which has been had is, of course, applicable as respects
new trials sought on the ground of misconduct. See 39
Am. Jur. New Trial, § 28 (1942).
Respondent submits that in the instant case there
occurred no misconduct on the part of the jury. Further,
that the alleged examination of the interior of certain
of the improvements at the appellants' property was
not misconduct or such as would create bias in the
mind of the jury or would be of such prejudicial character as to ·warrant a new trial since, respondent sub-
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mits, it i~ apparent the result ofanother trial would be
the same as that of the trial from which appellants now
appeal.
Whether the view of the premises by the jury
could have had any prejudicial effect must be considered in light of all the evidence in the case. \Vhen
the viewing is considered in light of the facts, supported
by the evidence, it appears not to be prejudicial.
The jury indicated by their verdict and the polling
following the delivery of the verdict that it was unanimous ( TR-221). No error has been shown which would
justify nullifying their verdict.

Respondent submits that the entire basis of this
appeal is the fact that the jury chose not to award
appellants any severance damages. Admittedly, as
pointed out by appellants on page 11 of their brief,
there was a discrepancy in the estimates of damage 1
between appraisers for respondent - § 75,432 (TR153) and the appraisers for the appellants,-$141,500
(TR-79) and $152,921 (TR-123), respectively. The ,
appraiser for respondent testified that in his opinion
the appellant landowners were not entitled to any seY·
erance damage (TR-155-158). See also Ex. P-15).
Appellants' appraisers testified respectively to $13,2-U
(TR-90. See also Ex. D-12) and $34,350 (TR-123.
See also Ex. D-13) as to severance damage.
The jury had the benefit of opinions from three
qualified experts as to the value of the land. Although

12

these opuuons varied considerably, it was within the
prerogative of the jury to believe whom it chose, and
it chose to believe respondent's expert rather than the
appellants'.
\Vheu a jury verdict is supported by competent
evidence, as was here the case, it is generally left
unaltered by this court. In this case, the alleged misconduct of the jury and alleged error committed by
the judge in allowing the jury to view the premises,
which could alter this rule, has not been demonstrated.
Appellants are trying to use the affidavits of certain jurors to impeach and overthrow their verdict contrary to the generally accepted view that such cannot
be done.
Ctah R. Civ. P. 59 (a) sets forth the grounds on
which a new trial may be granted and in what instances
the affidavit of a juror may be used. It states:
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted ... for any
of the following causes;

* * *

( 2) :Misconduct of the jury; and whenever

any one or more of the jurors have been induced
to assent to a general or special verdict, or . . .
to a determination by chance or as a result of
bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the
affidavit of any one of the jurors.
In the recent case of Smith v. Barnett, 17 Utah
:2d :240, 242, 408 P.2d 709 (1965), this Court stated
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with respect to the use of affidavits or jurors to show
misconduct under Rule 59:
This rule is iu complete accord with our
statutes and decisions on granting a new trial
prior to and since the adopting of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1950.... , we have
continued to follow the law· as previously established, and it is inconceivable that there was
any intention to change the law as previously
established in this state to authorize a showing
of misconduct of the jury by filing affidavits
of the jurors on any misconduct or irregularity
except to show that one or more of the jurors
were induced to assent to a finding by resort
to a determination by chance or bribery.

1

In affirming judgment for defendant in this personal injury action, the court continued:
Plaintiff makes no claim that its affidavits
even indicate that any juror was induced to ;,
assert to any provision or part of this verdict
by resort to chance or bribery so these affidavits do not meet the requirements of Rule
59 and were not admissable.
Affidavits of jurors will not be received to show
the grounds on which a jury verdict is rendered, nor
to show their misunderstanding of fact or law, nor
that they misunderstood the charge of the court, or
the effect of their verdict, nor their opinions, surmises,
and processes of reasoning in arriving at a verdict.
See Wheat v. Denver and R.G.W.R. Co., 122 Utah
418, 250 P.2d 932 (1952); Cooper v. Evans, 1 Utah
2d 68, 262 P.2d 278 (1953).
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r

1

Appellants herein do not claim that their affidavits
even indicate that any juror was induced to assent to
any provision or part of this verdict by resort to chance
or bribery. As such, they do not meet the requirements
of Rule 59 and hence do not establish adequate or
sufficient grounds for a new trial based on alleged jury
misconduct.
Although the trial court did indicate that a view
of the interior of the improvements would be of no
particular benefit to the jury (TR-203), there was no
specific charge or admonition to the jury that they were
not to examine the interior of the improvements. Consequently, respondent submits the jury could not have
been guilty of any of the misconduct as alleged by
appellants.
Since the appellants felt obliged to obtain the
affidavits of certain jurors to support their motion for
new trial, respondent felt obliged to obtain and file
counter-affidavits to rebut the allegations contained
in appellants' motion, since to fail to do so has been
held to constitute an admission of the truth of the
allegations contained in appellants' motion for new
trial and the supporting affidavits. See Butler v. Com1nonwealth Department of Highwa;zJS, ____ Ky. ____ , 387
S. \V .2d 687 ( 1967) . However, respondent submits that
at the hearing on appellants' motion, neither the appellant's affidavits nor the respondent's counter-affidavits
were considered by the trial court.
YVith respect to the claim by appellant that the

15

jury award was penurious and inadequate resulting
from the view by the jury of the property in question,
respondent submits that the defendant landowners have
the burden of establishing their damages in eminent
domain proceedings, and that in no way were the appellants deprived of a fair trial or their right of fully
presenting to the jury the legitimate aspects of damages for the taking of their property; and the jury's
award was well within the appraisal shown by the evidence. See State v. Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 317, 366
P.2d 76 (1961). The award was within the estimate
of value given by one of the expert witnesses, and being
thus supported by competent evidence is entitled to the
recognition and affirmation of this court. The fact
that the jury chose to render its verdict in harmony
"'ith the lowest of the available evaluations is not in
itself cause for revarsal. See Weber Basin Conservancy
D~trict v. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958).
This court has previously held that it should over·
rule the trial court's denial of a new trial involving a
jury verdict only when, upon a survey of all the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and when viewed in the light most favorable to
the jury verdict, the amount of the award cannot be
justified from the evidence on any reasonable basis.
The trial judge should not grant a new trial merely
because in his opinion the amount of the award was
insufficient or excessive. Such action is warranted only
when, to the trial judge; it seems clear that the jury
has misapplied or failed to take into account proven
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facts; or misunderstood or disregarded the law; or
made findings clearly against the weight of the evidence.
See Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P.2d 722
(1958); Paul v. Kirkendall, et al., I Utah 2d 350, 366
P.2d 701 ( 1961) at page 354:
. . . since the trial judge has seen and heard
the witnesses and had a first hand view of all
the evidence, and the proceedings throughout
the trial and has ruled on the admissability of
the evidence, and has instructed the jury on the
law governing their verdict, and had opportunity of observing the tactics of the counsel
throughout the trial and the jury's reaction
thereto, his ruling on a motion for a new trial
should not be overruled unless it clearly appears
that he has abused his discretion.
Respondent submits that in this instance the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants'
motion for additur, or, in the alternative, for new trial.
Further, there is no showing of misconduct on the
part of the jury.

CONCLUSION
It is apparent from an examination of the record
in this case that the jury verdict was well supported
by the evidence. Appellants have failed to show any
misconduct on the part of the jury. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to view the
property which \vas the subject of this litigation or in
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denying appellants' motion for additur, or, in the alternative, for new trial.
Respondent respectfully submits that the judgment of the district court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
'VARREN ~I. WEGGELAND
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
236 State Capitol

Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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